Virtual operators play a n i mportant r ole in s tabilizing t he competition pattern o f Ch ina's t elecommunication m arket and promoting the development of mobile communication.
Introduction
The f irst 11 mobile virtual network operator (hereinafter referred to as virtual operator) licenses were issued in Dec 12th, 2 013 following "Mobile Co mmunications Resale Services Pilot S cheme" promulgated by MIIT ( Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People's Republic Ch ina) dated J anuary 8, 2 013. A s ubstantial first step h as been made w ith private c apital entering the telecoms industry for the first time. Virtual operator lists of the second ba tch to 5th batch has be en released i n succession with 4 2 private e nterprises obtaining pilot approval from MIIT while MIIT finished project of examination a nd a pproval for pi lot a pplication of mobile communication resale by the end of December 18, 2014.
Virtual operators need reasonable price disparities between wholesale p rice an d retail o ne t o m ake p rofit at t he beginning of o peration a nd basic t elecom ope rators (hereinafter referred to as basic operators) carry out vertical price squeeze s trategy out of t heir o wn i nterests, n amely they may well increase wholesale price for virtual operators and in the meanwhile maintain or reduce the retail price [2] . Most v irtual operators struggle to s urvive w ith l imited o r even n egative m ark on which i s t he only r esource the virtual o perators c an m ake m oney. Therefore, it is n ot difficult t o i magine a lmost a ll v irtual operators have been operating at a loss so far.
On J anuary 6, 20 16, MIIT issued t he "MIIT's G uidance About Wholesale Prices Adjustment of Mobile Communication Resale Services", i t made clear the benchmark, the adjustment frequency of wholesale price as well a s normalized working m echanism, which aims at supporting a nd h elping virtual o perators by a djustment of wholesale p rice f or m obile co mmunication r esale services. But it is afraid that the Guidance can't bring the majority of money-losing vi rtual o perators into the bl ack completely although t he g uidance i mproves t he s ituation of l imited o r even negative mark on of virtual operators.
Pricing problems of mobile communication resale in China involves basic o perators, vi rtual o perators a nd government regulations bodies. It must inevitably impede the formation of effective c ompetition i n Ch ina telecom industry a nd reduce t he e fficiency i f this p roblem can't s olve s uitably. There ha d been a l ot o f r eforms a nd c hanges i n t he past twenty years, which have been analyzed by many scholars based on game t heory. B ut most of t hem were based on traditional m arkets a nd game o f basic o perators i nstead of game research between basic operators and virtual ones Mobile communication resale service is the second category of basic telecommunications services. It refers to the service that the r esale en terprises o f m obile co mmunication purchase the mobile communication service from the basic telecommunication ope rators owning mobile ne twork operators a nd repackage t hem into t heir ow n b rands and then s ell them to t he en d u sers. According t o t he requirements o f M IIT, t he r esale e nterprises of m obile communication use mobile c ommunication ne twork infrastructure of basic telecommunication operators such as wireless n etwork, core n etwork, t ransmission network a nd so on instead o f s elf-building. The r esale enterprises o f mobile communication service must self-build the customer service system. They can also build business support system such as integrated s ervice management system, billing system a nd operating system a s w ell if n ecessary. The virtual operators in this article refer in particularly to resale enterprises of mobile c ommunication s ervice, n amely MVNO (Mobile Virtual Network Operator).
The r elevant d ata of Qianzhan ind ustry research i nstitute showed the number of subscribers from virtual operators in China had reached 2 0.5 million by t he e nd of 2015. 39 of 42 resale en terprises obtaining l icenses for pilot a pproval have officially begun their o wn resale s ervice w ith 7 o f them having over a million of users. The number of users of top ten r esale enterprises accounts f or a bout 86% of t he total number of users fro m v irtual ope rators [10] . Virtual operators play an important and positive role in stabilizing competitive pattern of communications market in ou r country a nd pr omoting the de velopment of mobile communication.
Problems and r easons of mo bile c ommunication resale services in China
The fixed cost of virtual operators is much lower than basic telecom operators d ue t o unnecessary t elecom ne twork construction but they must pay heavy rental cost of telecom network, which leads to much higher variable cost part than basic telecom operators. The average cost of virtual operators is concerned with the n umber of e nd us ers. Th e virtual operators must acquire end users on a l arge scale as soon a s possible to reach t he b reak-even poin t in the early stage of operation [7] . Therefore, during this period of time virtual o perators worked a s c ompetitors m ust introduce some tariff at a l ower price to satisfy the c ustomers' expectations a nd snatch customers. But the product p rices are not as low as expected in the early stage of the operation. Some tariff from three basic telecom operators and several virtual operators with better development in are as below to be compared, especially in 50 to 60-yuan level. (note: "free card" of Snail pr ovide m obile c ommunications services through its own mobile game products, which wouldn't be compared in this article.) As you can see that tariff of the virtual operators lack price advantage coupled with cheaper prices of local p ackage of some b asic telecom o perators, which m akes i t d ifficult f or virtual operators to attract customers. The wholesale prices given by basic telecom operators are still high although data traffic wholesale p rice d ropped from ￥ 0.14/MB t o ￥ 0.10/MB under the resale mode of r esource pool. Therefore, it is not the advisable thing to do for the virtual
Advances in Computer Science Research, volume 62
operators to obtain subscribers through low price s trategy. Exaggerated publicity of cheap prices is bound to affect the long-term de velopment o f t he virtual operators and ev en become t he m ain reasons fo r users' complaints for t he virtual operators.
The sales revenue of virtual operators includes the mark on between wholesale an d r etail p rices o f m obile business, value-added i ncome of da ta flow application a nd datamation m ark on of voice services, s ynergies with primary s ervices. It's t he first t hing t o h ave e nough retail price difference i f v irtual operators w ant t o make profit a t the be ginning of o peration. Whereas t he b asic t elecom operators w ould c arry out t he strategy of v ertical p rice squeeze for their own interests due to the characteristics of the vertical integration of telecommunication, namely basic telecom ope rators who c ontrol t he upstream of t he m obile communication n etwork ( wholesale part) co mpete w ith virtual operators of i n t he downstream market ( retail p art) who rent the mobile network from basic operators in mobile voice, S MS, mobile d ata services [2] . The basic operators may i ncrease w holesale price f or virtual o perators to squeeze the profits of competitors while keeping or reducing their own retail price in the market, which leads to the perplexing problem of limited or even negative mark on of virtual operators.
The three biggest operators have decreased the data low fee dramatically which l eads t o a h uge c hange i n r etail p rice level due t o t he r equirement of our c ountry's " speed acceleration and lower fee" and deteriorated competition in 4G industry of basic telecom operators. The basic operators haven't ch anged t he resale p rice acc ordingly al though "MIIT's G uidance a bout w holesale p rices a djustment o f mobile communication resale services" already placed clear the be nchmarking a nd a djustment f requency of wholesale price which leads to the slower adjustment speed of virtual operators t han t he descend s peed of ba sic t elecom operators.
The virtual o perators o perating costs will be hi gher with uneconomical business cost and the cost for billing system construction, maintenance a nd s ervice i f they can 't find effective business mode of cross-subsidization which makes virtual o perators l ose p rofitability a nd s everely r estrict t he development of the virtual operators and even worse [7] .
Game analysis based on Bertrand Model
The market structure of oligopoly competition has changed from t he c ompetition among the three basic telecom operators t o more c omplex c ompetition a fter v irtual operators entered t he m arket. T here are t he c ompetition between basic operators as a whole and virtual operators as a w hole in addition t o t he c ompetition a mong basic operators, t he c ompetition between ba sic ope rators a nd virtual operators as well as t he c ompetition b etween b asic operators and virtual operators [4] .
We would c onsider a s tate o f c ompetition t hat t akes t he three basic telecom operators as a whole and also all virtual operators a s a whole t o s implify t he a nalysis. T he pricing game be tween vi rtual o perators a nd ba sic operators would be the research target based on Bertrand Model.
The a ssumption o f Bertrand M odel is: ( 1) t he oligopoly firms compete w ith eac h other by s electing p rice; (2) the oligopoly firms have homogeneous products; (3) there is no formal or i nformal c ollusion be havior among oligopoly firms [3] . [8] . To simplify the question, we suppose that there are fixed cost for both basic operators and virtual operators (telecom ope rators i n C hina s eldom c onsider t he fixed cost when decrease price.). We al so suppose t hat t he marginal cost for per increased unit output are C 1 and C 2 respectively [9] . Finally, suppose that basic operators a nd virtual o perators make t he decisions at t he s ame t ime, namely only considering static game problem. are t he h ighest p rice which can be sold on respectively by basic operators and virtual operators (i.e., the highest prices regulated by the government). The earnings for both players of t he game inc ome a re t heir r espective profits, denoted with u 1 and u 2 that are both price functions [9] , namely:
Because b oth p layers r ealize they reduce the p rice b ut the other p layer keep t he p rice, w hich ca n r aise t heir own market share and gain additional benefit; whereas it would lower m arket s hare a nd l ead t o m oney l oss for t hem. Therefore, both pl ayers w ould try to choose pr ice dr op strategy, i t i s easy t o reach the N ash e quilibrium [9] . Th e Nash equilibrium (P * 1 , P * 2 ) is to solve the maximum of P * 1 and P * 2 . W e can ge t the reaction function o f vi rtual operators and basic operators as follows because there is the maximum va lue when t he value of pa rtial de rivative f or revenue function is 0.
The Nash equilibrium（P The solutions of equations are as follows:
） is the only Nash equilibrium for the game. We substitute P Basic operators are market first-movers with strong strength while virtual operators a re market l ate co mers w ith w eak strength. C onsumers ha ve different requirements t owards their p roducts, s o a 1 ＞a 2 . Basic ope rators and vi rtual operators adopt similar t echnology and t hey are just different in brand and product quality so that b 1 Suppose that ne ither basic ope rators n or vi rtual o perators cares ab out each o ther's i nterests, t hey j ust t ry t o m ake benefit f or t hemselves e ven if they w ouldn't n eglect t he competitors' existence. It would make difference if consider the best result based on whole profit. We suppose the price that can m ake t he m aximum w hole profit as P（P＝P 1 ＝ P 2 ）, then whole profit is U＝PQ-CQ＝（P-C） （q 1 ＋ q 2 ）＝（P-C） （a 1 -b 1 P 1 ＋d 1 P 2 ＋a 2 -b 2 P 2 ＋ For basic operators, conspiracy can raise prices and increase profits in a ny w ay f rom t he a bove data. For v irtual operators, c onspiracy can raise p rices and increase p rofits only when t he cost difference be tween t he basic o perators and virtual operators is significant.
It i s the r eality t hat there is the gi gantic cost ga p between virtual o perators at t he ea rly s tage of operation and ba sic operators having run the business for many years. Therefore, the basic o perators a nd virtual o perators can make h igher profits respectively if they can cooperate and jointly decide the price than they do business under independent decisions scenario.
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Such c ooperation i s certainly not eas y because p ricing combination to a chieve m aximum pr ofit i s not a Nash equilibrium and both p layers realize the result t hat t hey would make higher profits if they decrease price while the other player keep the price and vice versa. Therefore, both players would choose to lower the price till it reachs a new Nash e quilibrium. The Bertrand Mod el may well e xplain the price war of mobile communication market in China.
From the above d ata can b e s een that t he hi gher cost difference between the basic operators and virtual operators, the cl oser the prices, the greater t he difference i n p rofits. Therefore, t he basic operators have motivation to maintain high w holesale prices which makes higher cost for virtual operators.
It's indispensable bringing regulator in game and increasing restraint and punishment for operators to curb the price war between ba sic operators a nd vi rtual operators, and competitive l imitation b ehavior o f b asic operators, which can change the revenue function. For example, if u 1 ＝u 1 （P 1 , P 2 ）-k·f（P 1 ）, k is the penalty factor which can show t he i ntensity of p unishment by r egulator t owards violation. T herefore, the government should e stablish corresponding laws a nd r egulations, increase the i ntensity of pu nishment for the v icious violations of pr ice competition and s etting up competitive barriers to achieve cooperation t o s ome e xtent in or der to lead t o benign development of coopetition.
The dvelopmental strategy of mobile communication resale service in China

Regulators and o perators cooperate co ncertedly to curb the virulent price competition
Firstly, both the basic telecom operators and virtual operators should realize the dangers of vi cious price competition and e stablish t he r ational m anagement methodology. Under t he m arket c ondition, t he price competition h as the ob vious interaction, namely one pa rt lower the prices and the other would also lower the prices to maintain the market share and a new cycle of depreciation would last accordingly that would ultimately lead to vicious competition of price-cutting spiral and loss at both sides as well a s d eclined e conomic benefit c ontinuously [9] . While price competition is the appearances of the competition, the fundamental c ompetitiveness o f e nterprises s hould be t he product c ompetition. T he o perators can s atisfy co nsumers' demand by focusing on pr oducts thr ough business innovation and constant introduction of new services in the meanwhile by strengthening the enterprises' ability through management i nnovation, c ost-down, and efficiency improvement [1] . Secondly, the corresponding laws and regulations should be established t o i mprove t he e fficiency of r egulation. T he price is the most concerned factor for consumers due to the developmental l evel of p roductivity. So, the existing operators w ith strong strength a lso t end t o push a side new entrants by lowering prices (even below cost). According to the analysis above, the more powerful regulatory penalties, the higher c ost the e nterprises ha ve in vi olation of lowing the price and the smaller space for price-cut. Therefore, it's necessary t o establish corresponding laws a nd r egulations, reinforce the pe nalty i ntensity f or the m alignant pr ice competition of vicious p rice-cut and vertical p rice s queeze in order to avoid chaotic price competition [9] .
B asic o perators should keep o pen-minded t o promote the mobile communication resale service
Wholesale and retail price difference is the guarantee of the virtual o perators' de velopment. The long -term m echanism to solve the problem has not been established although the three b asic operators cut t he w holesale p rice through different ways to alleviate the d ispute of negative mark on to some extent. The three basic operators should undertake more s ocial r esponsibility, keep ope n-minded and t hink about t he issue i n a l ong-run a s cen tral s tate-owned companies. In t he l ong run, basic o perators should cooperate with vi rtual o perators actively to establish a benign b usiness environment both f or their ow n interests and s ocial i nterests. F inally basic ope rators and v irtual operators should a djust from b eing driven b y policy to promoting t he de velopment of m obile c ommunication service spontaneously and voluntarily to pr omote the development of mobile communication r esale service in order to realize the multi-win f or basic o perators, v irtual operators and consumers.
Virtual operators should break away from low-price competition by innovation and being aggressive
Most vi rtual ope rators would a dopt l ow pr ice s trategy inevitably in the early stage of development to attract users according to the a nalysis above. For now , it d epends on wholesale pr ices pr ovided b y the ba sic operators whether the virtual operators can make profits to a large extent. The virtual o perators may hardly m ake profits a nd would ge t into the infinite loop of vicious competition if they only rely on differences b etween wholesale an d retail p rices [11] . So, in the era of mobile Internet, virtual operators don't hope to profit directly from the mobile communication services but should focus on the de ep management of the d ata flow, jump o ut o f t he t hinking m ode of l ow p rice c ompetition with innovation a nd being enterprising. Th ey c an c hange traditional t ariff m ode of t he b asic operators an d at tract users with reasonable tariff policy and r ich business portfolio. For e xample, they can pr ovide more re fined fee packages through the more thorough segmenting of market based on consumers' features [5] . They can also expand the scale an d i ncrease t he value o f d ata f low b y i nnovative billing m ode. And t hey c an m ake va rious packages for different t ypes o f m obile t erminals a s traffic c onsumption ability and differences between the users of different types of m obile t erminals [7] . T hey can al so i ntegrate a l arge Research, volume 62 number o f services t ypes a nd g rades t o p rovide a r icher business mix. And they can develop comprehensive service of voice, video, or data flow with lower price than products of basic operators. It's not necessary for virtual operators to make profit on the mobile communications services but do it w ith i mprovement of the a ttraction a nd c ompetitiveness for the c ore b usiness by us ing d ata f low as a m eans to combine t heir o wn c ore business a nd mobile services closely in order to ultimately make profits as a whole.
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Both parties of mobile comunication resale services s hould negotiate f urther about res ale price t o realize actual price linkage
The price o f mobile c ommunication resale services is determined by both parties and relatively fixed in a certain period. T his k ind of p rice d ecision mechanism is lack o f flexibility, e specially when the b asic t elecom o perators reduce retail p rice frequently. The w holesale price which virtual o perators get is n ot actually lower t han t he retail price of basic operators, which makes the virtual operators losing price a dvantage and restricting their development. Simply r ely on t he m onopoly price ad vantage wouldn't improve the competitive ability of basic operators. In a long term, i t d oesn't l ead t o t he w in-win s ituation if virtual operators can't develop [4] . T herefore, basic o perators a nd virtual operators s hould m ake f urther ne gotiation to f igure out the more flexible pricing mode.
There should be a certain gap between the wholesale prices of virtual operators and the retail prices of basic operators. The w holesale prices obtained by vi rtual o perators should be a djusted a ccordingly while the retail p rices o f b asic operators have ch anged d ramatically t hat makes w holesale prices with real and dynamic adjustment mechanism. Therefore, n egotiated p rices can become f loating p rices t o solve the problem of negative mark on.
Conclusion
Mobile communication resale services make private capital play an i mportant r ole with the a dvantages of innovation and flexibility, satisfy t he mobile users with the applicable requirement of d iversification, individuation and differentiation. I n the m eanwhile, resale services also enhance t he c ompetitive l evel an d s ervice l evel o f t he mobile communication market, play a role in optimizing the market c ompetition p attern. This a rticle analyzes preliminarily pricing s trategy of mobile c ommunications resale service and co -cooperation m odes b etween basic operators a nd vi rtual operators as w ell a s g overnmental regulation based on B ertrand m odel. Of c ourse, t here ar e some pr oblems we c ouldn't have t he in-depth di scussions. For e xample, i n order t o simplify t he a nalysis, this a rticle supposed that the consumers had the same level of sensitive to the p rices an d basic o perators and vi rtual operators ha d the s ame coefficient of p roduct s ubstitution. In f act, b 1 and b 2 , d 1 and d 2 may not be equal, which remains to be researched further in the future.
With t he i ndustrial policy a nd m arket e nvironment, basic operators and virtual o perators must be a ble t o dr ive t he industry innovation to co -create new s ituation o f mobile communication market in China as long as they can stick to a relation of both competition and cooperation by means of the opportunity of mobile communication service.
